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1. Introduction 
Thomas Kuhn (1970) famously argued that successive paradigms in the sciences are 
incommensurable. It is therefore a challenge for philosophers of science to explain 
how adherents of successive paradigms can nevertheless engage in rational 
communication during periods of “deep conceptual change.” The transition from 
Newtonian to relativistic mechanics is widely accepted as the paradigmatic example. 
Michael Friedman’s (2001; 2002a,b; 2008; 2010) strategy in addressing this 
challenge is to divide the scientific discourse into three levels. In order to account 
for rational communication about competing theory frameworks (paradigms), he 
argues that meta-philosophical arguments are required. 
Common to Kuhn’s and Friedman’s positions is the assumption that 
scientific theories are linguistic entities and that successful communication about 
them implies a realist view of semantics whenever theories predict natural 
phenomena. As a theory’s terms—for instance, mass—then apply by reference to 
things—for instance, planets—communicative impediments would appear to arise 
because of the differences in how referents are construed across paradigms.  
Our aim in this article is to present an alternative way of meeting Kuhn’s challenge. 
Our strategy is to see a theory as a constraint on a spatial structure (the framework of 
a theory). We model such frameworks in terms of conceptual spaces (Gärdenfors, 
2000; Gärdenfors and Zenker, 2013). By analyzing different kinds of changes within 
such spatial structures, one can understand Kuhn’s challenge in a way that eschews 
incommensurability and that does not require meta-philosophical discussions.  
 The communicative impediments arising in deep conceptual change may 
thus be alleviated by focusing on the structural representation of concepts in 
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conceptual spaces instead of their possible referents. This shifts focus away from 
referents and towards the structure of concepts. The theory of conceptual spaces, 
then, is employed as a particular example of a more general answer to Kuhn’s 
challenge. We also believe that our perspective lies closer to what scientists actually 
use in their thinking and communication. The paper proceeds as follows: we 
present how conceptual frameworks can be understood as spatial entities (Sect. 2), 
how the dynamics of such frameworks may be analyzed in the diachronic case (Sect. 
3), and how to address communicative challenges that are caused by meaning 
change (Sect. 4). We then contrast our approach with Michael Friedman’s neo-
Kantianism (Sect. 5), and argue that an explanation of rational communication 
between proponents of successive paradigms need not rely on meta-philosophical 
paradigms (Sect. 6). 
 
2. Conceptual Frameworks as Spatial Entities 
The theory of conceptual spaces builds on a cognitivist view of semantics. It 
contrasts with both extensional and intensional realistic semantics that include the 
referent of a linguistic expression as a meaning constituent. On our approach, 
conceptual knowledge is seen as mental representations, modeled in conceptual 
spaces. Since we do not believe in the existence of a mental language (“Mentalese”), 
we do not view such representations as parts of a symbolic system with a syntactic 
or logical structure. Instead, we treat them as spatial structures that can be analyzed 
into their constitutive dimensions and properties, representing the semantic 
knowledge of an agent (Gärdenfors, 2000, 2014).  
4 
An empirical theory always presupposes a specific conceptual framework 
that provides the magnitudes, or dimensions, on which the formulation of this theory 
depends. These magnitudes can be modeled as collections of dimensions with their 
inter-relations, that is, as conceptual spaces (Gärdenfors, 2000; Gärdenfors & 
Zenker, 2011; 2013; Zenker & Gärdenfors, 2013; Zenker, 2014). Put schematically, 
an empirical theory, T, depends on a conceptual framework, F, that is modeled as a 
conceptual space, S. 
Apart from concepts arising in sensory perception, e.g., color or sound, or in 
basic scientific measurements, magnitudes include those introduced by science, for 
instance, mass, force, and energy. The topological or metrical structure of such 
magnitudes is tightly connected to the methods by which they can be measured, and 
to their relations to other concepts within a scientific theory. Newtonian mass, for 
instance, can be modeled as a dimension that is isomorphic to the non-negative part 
of the real number line, and Newtonian space as a three dimensional integral 
(vector) space with Euclidian metric. (We return to this example below.)  
 The primary role of the dimensions is to represent various “qualities” of 
objects in different domains. The notion of a domain can be given a more precise 
meaning by using the notions of separable and integral dimensions. Dimensions are 
said to be integral if, to describe an object fully, one cannot assign it a value on one 
dimension without giving it a value on the other. For example, an object cannot be 
given a hue without also giving it a brightness value. Or the pitch of a sound always 
goes along with its loudness. Dimensions that are not integral are said to be 
separable, as for example the size and hue dimensions. Within the context of 
scientific theories, the distinction should rather be defined in terms of measurement 
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procedures. If two dimensions (or sets of dimensions) can be measured by 
independent methods, then they are separable, otherwise they are integral.  
It is therefore part of the meaning of “integral dimensions” that they share a 
metric, which separable dimensions do not. A theory domain can now be defined as 
the set of integral dimensions that are separable from all other dimensions in a 
theory, for instance Newton’s domain of absolute space.1  
The choice of domains need not be uniquely determined, for the organization 
of dimensions into domains depends on which dimensions are considered basic for a 
theory. In the literature one finds organization principles that are theoretically 
motivated, e.g., via transformation classes, or motivated by practical considerations, 
e.g., via measurement procedures. The set of domains thus depends on the choice of 
basic dimensions (notably the basic ones given by the International System of 
Units—SI-units), and the choice of useful derived dimensions. Both ontological and 
epistemological considerations have historically informed which dimensions are 
considered basic and which are derived, but our notion of what constitutes a domain 
is an instrumentalist one. This notion is independent of ontological positions, and 
while it is compatible with calling certain dimensions basic or fundamental that are 
found to be epistemologically prior, no such distinction is required.
2
 
                                                 
1
 More precisely, domain C is separable from D in a theory, if and only if the 
invariance transformations of the dimensions in C do not involve any dimension 
from D; and the dimensions of a domain C are integral, if and only if their 
invariance class does not involve any other dimension (Gärdenfors & Zenker, 2013). 
2
 Albert Einstein, for instance, appears to have been well aware of the Kantian 
tradition, yet opposed to singling out some concepts as privileged or 
epistemologically prior: 
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Contrasting with our instrumentalist notion, Kuhn’s incommensurability 
thesis derives from a view on semantics that requires all concepts to have referents. 
His paradigmatic example in support of the thesis is that changes in meaning of the 
scientific variables (dimensions) go along with a change of referent.
 
He writes:  
 
“The variables and parameters that in [the statements which Kuhn refers to 
as] the Einsteinian Ei’s represented spatial position, time, mass, etc. still 
occur in the [Newtonian] Ni’s and they still represent Einsteinian space, time 
and, mass. But the physical referents of these Einsteinian concepts are by no 
means identical with those of the Newtonian concepts that bear the same 
name. (Newtonian mass is conserved; Einsteinian is convertible with energy. 
Only at low relative velocities may the two be measured in the same way, 
and even then they must not be conceived to be the same.)” (Kuhn, 1970, 
101f.; italics added)  
 
And it is vis-à-vis such a semantic realism that Kuhn can claim that the 
predecessor and the successor theory in a paradigm shift are non-intertranslatable. 
Since our position is basically instrumentalist, we do not count a theoretical 
term such as mass as one that has a direct reference in an external world. 
                                                                                                                                         
“One must not … speak of the ‘ideality of space.’ ‘Ideality’ pertains to all 
concepts, those referring to space and time no less and no more than all others. 
Only a complete scientific conceptual system comes to be univocally 
coordinated with sensory experience. On my view, Kant has influenced the 
development of our thinking in an unfavorable way, in that he has ascribed a 
special status to spatio-temporal concepts and their relations in contrast to 
other concepts.” (Einstein, 1924, 1690f.; cited after Howard, 2010, 347)  
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Consequently, we can analyze, and then compare, different mass concepts solely in 
virtue of their distinct dimensional reconstitutions, and their relations to other 
concepts.
3
 Newtonian mass, for instance, is separable from everything else in 
Newtonian theory; it constitutes a separate dimension because an object’s mass 
remains constant, and so is independent of variations in other magnitudes such as the 
object’s position or velocity. Relativistic mass, in contrast, is integral with energy in 
special relativity: the mass of a moving object increases as its kinetic energy 
increases, given the object has non-zero rest mass. The term mass thus takes on 
different meanings in these two theories. Both meanings can nevertheless be 
compared—something Kuhn was well aware of (d’Agostino, 2013). But, as we will 
argue, it is misleading to present the meaning difference as giving rise to 
communicative difficulties of the kind that Kuhn took to support his claim according 
to which proponents of successive paradigms cannot engage in rational discourse—
and so they must resort to less rational forms of interaction (see below). 
Within a cognitive theory of meaning, as we have stated, the meaning of 
mass is analyzed non-realistically through a dimensional (spatial) representation. 
This view of the semantics of a scientific concept can be extended so that the 
dynamics of a scientific conceptual framework may be treated in like manner. We 
do this by analytically separating the types of changes that modify a predecessor 
framework into a successor framework. The term framework we here understand as 
the conceptual space that a scientific theory builds on.  
                                                 
3
 Conversely, allegedly different concepts are in fact not distinct when sharing the 
same meaning in virtue of their identical dimensional forms and identical relations 
to other concepts. 
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Applying this typology yields a systematic analogue to the actual historical 
dynamics of theory frameworks insofar as a predecessor conceptual space can be 
modified into a successor space. As we argue below, it becomes plausible that, by 
understanding scientific concepts as spatial entities, scientists may successfully and 
rationally communicate about different concepts, their non-referentially conceived 
meanings, and thus about the dynamics of empirical theories in which these concepts 
are used. The threat of incommensurability is thereby eschewed. Before considering 
the arguments for this, we first turn to the types of changes that modify a conceptual 
framework.  
 
3. The Dynamics of Conceptual Frameworks for Theories 
In earlier work, we have provided a range of historical examples of five types of 
changes to a scientific conceptual framework (Gärdenfors & Zenker, 2011, 2013). 
Here we restrict ourselves to a brief overview. In order of increasing severity of 
change, the following are distinguished: addition and deletion of special laws; 
change of metric; change in importance; change in separability; addition and 
deletion of dimensions.  
Firstly, in our model, the special laws of a theory provide constraints on the 
distribution of points over a conceptual space. Newton’s second axiom, for instance, 
restricts points to the hyper-surface described by F=ma in the conceptual space 
consisting of the domains time, mass, (physical) space, and force (Gärdenfors, 2000; 
Gärdenfors & Zenker, 2013). The law of gravitation further restricts these points to 
regions where F=GMm/r
2
 holds (Zenker, 2009, 41f.). The addition or deletion of 
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axioms and special laws is the mildest type of change, as it leaves the conceptual 
framework intact.  
Secondly, each domain is endowed with a scale or metric that determines 
distances. For instance, day and nighttime are standardly modeled by one circular 
dimension with 24 equally-sized intervals called hours. Before the invention of 
mechanical clocks, however, the two points on this dimension that separate twelve 
hours of nighttime from twelve hours of daytime were commonly coordinated 
locally to sunrise and sunset. As these points shift, again locally, over the course of 
one year, their distance changes.
4
 This variable temporal metric has meanwhile 
given way to one of constant clock intervals. The same occurred in the case of 
space—yet in the inverse direction, namely from constant to variable—where the 
Euclidian metric assumed by Newton first gave way to a Minkowskian (special 
relativity) and then to a Schwarzschild metric (general relativity), which may both 
be viewed to generalize the Euclidian. It is easy to see that a change of metric leads 
to a change in the symbolic expressions used to calculate with these distances.  
Thirdly, the extant dimensions (or domains) provided by a scientific 
framework may change in importance. Energy, for instance, remained of little 
importance to Newtonian mechanics (Gärdenfors & Zenker, 2013). In contrast, 
forces became ever more important in the development of 19
th
 century fluid 
dynamics, amongst others through a separation into short and long range forces 
(Petersen & Zenker, 2014).  
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 Consequently, the expression “days are longer in summer than in winter” was 
literally true although nights and days were always twelve hours long. But the length 
of an hour varied from day to day, ever more markedly so over the contrasting 
seasons at locations further away from the equator. 
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Fourthly, more severe yet are changes in the separability of dimensions, for 
instance the integration of mass with energy in relativistic physics, discussed above, 
or the formation of integral 4D space-time.  
Fifthly, the most radical type of change is the addition to or the deletion of a 
dimension from a scientific framework as in the addition of the dimension charge in 
electrodynamics, or the abandonment of a dimension known as caloric in early 
accounts of thermo-dynamical phenomena. 
The first of the five types addresses intra-framework changes; the other four 
types describe inter-framework changes. Categorizing changes of theories into these 
five types provides a finer grain than Kuhn’s distinction between normal and 
revolutionary change. This gives us a richer toolbox to analyze the changes of a 
theory or its associated framework over time (for a case study see Gärdenfors & 
Zenker, 2013). What is commonly referred to as scientific revolution, we categorize 
primarily under the last type: the replacement of dimensions. 
 
4. Meaning Change and Communicative Challenges 
This typology of scientific changes in hand, one can now address cases where a 
predecessor conceptual framework is replaced by a successor framework, while the 
latter framework retains terms already used by the former. In short, one can address 
the kind of meaning change said to be typical of a “scientific revolution.” In contrast 
to proponents of realistic semantics, our typology of changes allows to avoid the 
commitment that such frameworks (and the theories expressed relative to them) are 
non-intertranslatable because their shared terms diverge referentially. Since external 
referents are not central to our cognitivist account, the communicative challenges 
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that proponents of pre- and post-revolutionary theories might face do consequently 
not arise from referential divergence. Such divergence, therefore, does not pose a 
threat to communicative rationality. To follow Kuhn’s main example, even if the 
meaning of mass is different in Newtonian mechanics and Einstein’s relativity 
theory, it does not follow that the two meanings cannot be compared, since the 
geometric and topological properties of the Newtonian and Einsteinian frameworks 
still have a considerable overlap. Nor does it follow, provided such overlap but 
without referential stability, that proponents of successive paradigms must engage in 
broadly non-rational forms of communication. 
Put differently, even if communicative difficulties are expectable in periods 
of deep conceptual change
5
, these impediments may be alleviated by focusing on the 
structural representation of concepts in conceptual spaces instead of their possible 
referents. Historically, it seems that scientists’ communicative difficulties do not 
pertain to the role of the central concepts in scientific reasoning, but rather to 
unrelated factors such as their ontological commitments or research traditions.  
We believe that an understanding of conceptual frameworks as 
dimensionally structured spaces also suffices to explain cases of successful and 
rational communication between scientists. Our view nevertheless remains at odds 
with Michael Friedman’s account who postulates various explanatory levels to 
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 Rudolph Carnap, Kuhn’s editor for Structure (see Reisch, 1991), for instance, 
states: 
“I have found that most scientists and philosophers are willing to discuss a 
new assertion, if it is formulated in the customary conceptual framework; but 
it seems very difficult to most of them even to consider and discuss new 
concepts.” (Schilpp, 1963, 77) 
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render cases of severe conceptual change as communicatively rational. We now turn 
to a comparison with his perspective. 
 
5. Michael Friedman’s Neo-Kantianism 
Having outlined conceptual spaces as a non-linguistic model of conceptual 
knowledge, we now turn to a presentation of the central tenets of Michael 
Friedman’s influential Neo-Kantian account. It presents a modern version of Kantian 
epistemology that intends to render scientific revolutions as “communicatively 
rational” instances of scientific development. Friedman borrows this term from 
Jürgen Habermas’s (1984, 1987) theory of communicative action where it broadly 
signifies the “non-coercively uniting, consensus creating power of argumentative 
speech” (Habermas, cited after Friedman, 2001, 54).  
Communicative rationality here contrasts with instrumental rationality. The 
latter governs the strategic choice among extant means, options, or tools, in order to 
satisfy, or optimize on, goals, purposes, or criteria, broadly conceived. Applied to 
the scientific case, for instance, instrumental rationality pertains to choosing among 
a range of available candidates that theory which is simpler, more empirically 
adequate, more fruitful, has greater scope, etc. A theory thus selected standardly 
constitutes an instrumentally rational choice with respect to the relevant goal or 
criterion, only if it is not dominated by another theory (maximization of choice 
utility).  
Communicative rationality, on the other hand, pertains—or, as the case may 
be, fails to pertain—not to the selection among extant means or tools, but to the 
communicative process that makes “the serious consideration of [a theory that only 
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arises with] the new paradigm a rational and responsible option” (Friedman, 2002a, 
190, italics added; see his 2010, 714). So communicative rationality refers to the 
rational quality of the interaction—itself antecedent to theory choice—that renders 
the new paradigm (e.g., relativistic mechanics) acceptable as a strategically rational 
option, and more particularly as an additional option for those scientists (e.g., the 
“Newtonians”) who had formerly adhered strictly to the old paradigm only. 
An immediate consequence of Friedman’s view is that coercive or otherwise 
broadly non-rational forms of communication and persuasion need not be postulated. 
For whenever such a process can in fact be communicatively rational in the sense of 
instantiating a form of non-coercive rational persuasion, then it makes little sense to 
suggest, as Kuhn (1970, ch. IX) did,
6
 that the conversion of “old paradigmers” be a 
matter of merely assent-directed persuasion, thereby leveling the distinction between 
rational consensus and mere consensus.
7
 
This being the purpose for which Friedman employs his Neo-Kantian 
account, we now turn to his notion of the relativized a priori (Sect. 5.1) and the role 
of philosophical meta-paradigms in deep conceptual change (Sect. 5.2). 
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 Addressing the “genetic aspect of the parallel between political and scientific 
development” that “should no longer be open to doubt,” Kuhn writes:  
“As in political revolutions, so in paradigm choice—there is no standard 
higher than the assent of the relevant community. To discover how scientific 
revolutions are effected, we shall therefore have to examine not only the 
impact of nature and of logic, but also the techniques of persuasive 
argumentation effective within the quite special groups that constitute the 
community of scientists.” (Kuhn, 1970, 94) 
7
 Hence, securing the communicative rationality of paradigm shifts is also an attempt 
at criticizing the relativistic inclinations of the strong program in the sociology of 
scientific knowledge (“SSK program”) (Rehg, 2009, 14–80; see Friedman, 1998). 
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5.1 The relativized a priori  
Immanuel Kant had declared Newtonian time and space as a priori forms of human 
thinking, particularly an absolute space with Euclidian metric, and Newton’s notion 
of absolute time. Because these forms make measurements in the empirical world 
possible, they are treated as constitutive of empirical knowledge. The a priori forms 
can also be expressed linguistically as principles. They then become, for instance, 
“the Newtonian Laws of Motion in the context of the Principia, the light principle 
and the principle of relativity in the context of [Einsteinian] special relativity, [or] 
the light principle and the principle of equivalence in the context of general relativity 
…” (Friedman, 2010, 713).8 The a priori forms and their corresponding principles 
are taken to enable the kind of knowledge that empirical theories express by means 
of special laws such as Newton’s law of gravitation (or later Einstein’s field 
equations)—knowledge that serves in the prediction of natural phenomena. The a 
priori principles of Newton’s absolute space and absolute time, as Friedman 
stresses, changed in the transition from Newtonian to relativistic physics at the turn 
of the 20
th
 century, enabled by prior historical developments in mathematics and 
geometry and culminating in Einstein’s theory of relativity. Following Hans 
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 Newton’s laws of motions standardly comprise inertia, F=ma and, on many 
accounts, also actio=reactio. For general and special relativity, the light principle 
dictates that the speed of light be constant for all observers irrespective of their 
motion relative to the light’s origin. In special relativity, the principle of relativity 
says that the laws of physics be the same for all objects moving in inertial reference 
frames (i.e. those of constant velocity). In general relativity, the principle of 
equivalence expresses that “bodies affected only by gravitation follow geodesics in a 
variably curved space-time geometry” (Friedman, 2002a, 187).  
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Reichenbach (1920), who called them “axioms of coordination” (see Padovani, 
2011), Friedman treats such principles as methodological a priori propositions. 
Serving the same function as they did for Kant, the principles remain constitutive of 
experience but are not forever fixed, and so can be altered as science develops. 
Relativized to historical eras, then, a principle comes to reflect the systematic stage 
of scientific theorizing reached at a historical moment, rather than an inbuilt or 
otherwise pre-determined constraint on the cognitive apparatus of theory-users.  
Once relativized, Friedman argues, a Neo-Kantian version of the a priori may 
be retained, while Kant’s original one must be abandoned. This Neo-Kantian version 
is assigned with a significant task in the explanation of radical conceptual change in 
the transition from Newtonian to Einsteinian physics.
9
 According to him, the explicit 
acknowledgement of philosophical meta-paradigms—including Kant’s own, in 
which a priori forms of thinking have their modern historical origin—is necessary 
and, in combination with other elements of Friedman’s account, also sufficient to 
successfully address the “Kuhnian challenge.” The challenge, according to 
Friedman, is to make understandable how a rational form of mutual inter-
paradigmatic communication between proponents of rivaling scientific paradigms, 
old and new, can be achieved when these paradigms are incommensurable in the 
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 “[W]hat I call the dynamics of reason is not intended to be a general theory of 
scientific change at all—rather, it is a particular historical narrative accompanied by 
a particular philosophical gloss. The point, on my view, is that the transition from 
Newton to Einstein is the most important challenge to the Enlightenment ideal of 
scientific rationality championed by Kant … , and I am attempting to respond to this 
challenge, accordingly, by reexamining this particular transition in considerably 
more historical detail.” (Friedman, 2010, 714) 
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sense of relying on non-intertranslatable conceptual frameworks, as explained 
above.  
Friedman’s response to Kuhn’s challenge particularly arises from the need 
“to explain, prospectively, how the new framework becomes rational, a ‘live’ 
option” (Kindi, 2011, 337) for those who adhere to the old paradigm. This notion of 
prospective rationality, holds Friedman, is distinct from the rationality afforded by a 
standard account of inter-theory reduction (see Batterman, 2012). Here, the set of 
models, M, that are provided by a theory of the old paradigm, T, are (approximately) 
reduced to limiting cases of particular models from the set M* provided by a theory 
T* that belongs to the new paradigm. The models of T are thus (approximately) 
likened to those of T*.
10
 For Friedman, however, a convergence of mathematical 
structures through inter-theory reduction can at most demonstrate that a paradigm 
shift is retrospectively rational. That is, the change from the old to the new theory is 
but unilaterally rational, namely from the point of view of the new paradigm. From 
the point of view of the old paradigm, however, an analogue to inter-theory 
reduction, one that would similarly render the transition to the new paradigm as a 
rational instance of conceptual development, is unavailable. Moreover, ontological 
or referential differences, as we have seen, provide Kuhn with the primary reason to 
attest a divergence of meaning between (the terms shared by) incommensurable 
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 In relativistic contexts, for instance, momentum is expressed as p=m0v/√(1−(v/c)
2
), 
where v is the velocity and c the speed of light. The special relativity form converges 
to the Newtonian p=mv as v goes to zero. So the relativistic form reduces the 
Newtonian one, because √(1−(v/c)2) approaches 1 as (v/c)2 approaches 0.  
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conceptual frameworks.
11
 And such referential meaning divergence remains 
unaddressed by limiting case reduction. Friedman essentially accepts referential 
divergence as capturing “a centrally important aspect of what he [Kuhn] has called 
the non-intertranslatability or ‘incommensurability’ of pre-revolutionary and post-
revolutionary theories” (Friedman, 2002a, 186, n.14). In particular, that such 
referential divergences arise in paradigm shifts would seem to make it more 
understandable that proponents of the old and the new paradigm face communicative 
difficulties—for they may find themselves “living in different worlds,” worlds 
populated by different things—and so would render it more understandable that they 
allegedly have to sway one another into the adoption of one or the other paradigm. 
 
5.2 The role of philosophical meta-frameworks 
Friedman’s form of Neo-Kantianism takes issue with the holistic picture, standardly 
ascribed—as the Duhem-Quine thesis—to Pierre Duhem and Willard Van Orman 
Quine (see Brenner, 1990), according to which our “web of belief” faces the tribunal 
of experience in toto (Duhem), so that each of its elements is as prone to 
modification as any other (Quine). Friedman instead proposes “an alternative picture 
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 Friedman places Kuhn within Cassirer’s genetic conception that sees scientific 
knowledge to “progress from naively realistic ‘substantialistic’ conceptions, 
focusing on underlying substances, causes, and mechanisms subsisting behind the 
observable phenomena, to increasingly abstract purely ‘functional’ conceptions” 
(2008, 244). But both Kuhn’s notion of paradigm shift in Structure and his 
subsequent replacement for paradigm, the structured lexicon, also draw on diverging 
ontologies, or referent-shifts. Kuhn’s position, Friedman argues, therefore also 
reflects the Meyersonian substantialistic view, although it is directly opposed to 
Cassirer’s.  
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of a thoroughly dynamical yet nonetheless differentiated system of knowledge that 
can be analyzed … into three main components or levels” (Friedman, 2002a, 189). 
The first level houses the component that faces experience directly, namely the 
“empirical laws of nature, such as the Newtonian law of gravitation or Einstein’s 
equations for the gravitational field” (ibid.). As we have seen, in our diction such 
laws or equations correspond to specific constraints on the distribution of points 
over a conceptual space.  
The second level comprises the “constitutively a priori principles that define 
the fundamental spatio-temporal framework within which alone the rigorous 
formulation of first or base level principles is possible” (ibid.). From our 
perspective, second level principles correspond to (parts of) the conceptual space 
itself. For instance, principles expressing Newton’s integral 3D space with its 
Euclidian metric, as well as Newton’s separate 1D time or Einstein’s integral 4D 
space-time with its non-Euclidian (Schwarzschild) metric explicitly count as a priori 
on the second level for Friedman.
 
In contrast, Newton’s separate 1D mass and the 
integral 3D force—being magnitudes that to successfully apply in predicting natural 
phenomena presupposes having assigned values on the space and time dimensions—
may appear to count as being a priori at most implicitly. But Friedman goes on to 
claim that “[t]hese relativized a priori principles [at level two] constitute what Kuhn 
calls paradigms: relatively stable sets of rules of the game, as it were, that make 
possible the problem-solving activities of normal science [all of which involve the 
adoption, maintenance, or rejection of laws at level one]…” (ibid.), thus indicating 
that principles governing mass and force might count as a priori, too. After all, in 
order to predict a gravitational phenomenon such as a planetary orbit, for instance, 
19 
one of the Newtonian “rules” of normal science prescribes that one enrich models 
that already feature values on the time and the space dimensions by stipulating 
suitable values for the dimensions of mass and force.
12
 Friedman’s second level 
would then comprise the entire conceptual framework or, in our diction, the 
conceptual space spanned by the dimensions with their metrics as these combine 
into domains.
13
 This excludes from level two only the constraints on the distribution 
of points otherwise known as empirical laws, and located at his level one. 
The second level provides Friedman with the necessary background so that 
the adoption, maintenance, and rejection of laws at level one—in the course of 
Kuhn’s “normal science”—can be understood as an empirical matter, that is, as a 
matter of methodologically-hardened
14
 corroboration or falsification. On the other 
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 In structuralist terms, the process is that of enriching a partial potential model of 
Newtonian mechanics to a full model of the theory. The structuralist approach is 
compared to the conceptual spaces approach in Gärdenfors & Zenker (2011) and 
Zenker & Gärdenfors (2013) where it is shown, among others, that the structuralist’s 
three kinds of models—potential, partial potential, and full model—can be provided 
with spatial analogues. In each case, respectively, these models are understood as 
ever more restrictive constraints on the distribution of points over the space.  
13
 Friedman perhaps comes closest to such distinctions when he reports the early 
Carnap as having offered “a generalization of Kant’s conception of spatial intuition 
according to which only the infinitesimally Euclidean character of physical space is 
a priori determined by the form of our intuition …, whereas the choice of 
specifically ‘metrical form’ (whether Euclidean or non-Euclidean) is ‘optional 
[wahlfrei]’” (2002b, 24). Compare our second type of change (Sect. 3). 
14
 In criticism of Karl Popper’s falsificationism, Imre Lakatos (1978) introduced the 
notion of a methodologically hardened fact. Unlike naive falsificationists, who treat 
empirical data (“facts”) as indubitable—so that facts always “win” in case of a 
conflict between theory and observation—and also unlike methodological 
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hand, the adoption, maintenance, or rejection of level-two-conceptual frameworks or 
paradigms—in the course of Kuhn’s “revolutionary science”—cannot be handled as 
empirical processes in this sense. Friedman writes that,  
 
“no straightforward process of empirical testing [of the paradigm-constitutive 
a priori principles at level two], in periods of deep conceptual revolution, is 
then possible. Here our third level, that of philosophical meta-paradigms or 
meta-frameworks, plays and indispensable role, by serving as a source of 
guidance and orientation in motivating and sustaining the transition from one 
paradigm or conceptual framework to another. Such philosophical meta-
frameworks contribute to the rationality of revolutionary change, more 
specifically, by providing a basis for mutual communication (and thus for 
communicative rationality in Habermas’s sense) between otherwise 
incommensurable (and therefore non-intertranslatable) scientific paradigms.” 
(Friedman, 2002a, 189) 
 
The role that Friedman envisions for philosophical meta-paradigms or meta-
frameworks is that of “guiding the articulation of the new space of possibilities 
[delivered by the successor paradigm] and making the serious consideration of the 
                                                                                                                                         
falsificationists, who treat as indubitable the observational theory that yields these 
facts, sophisticated methodological falsificationists “harden” their facts by 
presupposing a hierarchy of observational theories. So it is only the acceptance of an 
order of auxiliary theories that enables the theory to “lose” against experience 
(falsification) or to confirm it (corroboration). Conversely, when the predicting 
theory shall be maintained for some reason, then the facts may be “softened” by 
doubting the observational theory on which they rely (see Zenker, 2009, ch. 4).  
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new paradigm [by those committed to the old one] a rational and responsible option” 
(Friedman, 2002a, 190). Like the second level, also the third functions in the spirit 
of a Kantian program, a program that seeks to explicate conditions of possibility. 
Among these meta-paradigms, for instance, Friedman counts the “new approach to 
the understanding of nature self-consciously crafted by Descartes and Galileo 
against the backdrop of medieval Scholasticism” (Friedman, 2001, 23), and of 
course Einstein’s “recognition of a new item, as it were, in the space of intellectual 
possibilities: namely the possibility of a relativized conception of time and 
simultaneity” (ibid.). A meta-paradigm shall deliver “new conceptions of what a 
coherent rational understanding of nature might amount to” (ibid.). It is, in brief, “a 
source of new ideas, alternative programs, and expanded possibilities that is not 
itself scientific in the same sense—that does not, as do the sciences themselves, 
operate within a generally agreed upon framework of taken for granted rules” (ibid.)  
To summarize, the meta-paradigms at level three make possible the adoption, 
maintenance, and revision of a priori principles at level two; and the level two a 
priori principles make possible the adoption, maintenance, and revision of empirical 
laws at level one.  
Friedman’s position is thus that philosophical discourse is necessary for 
communicatively rational scientific progress in the face of radical conceptual 
change. The third level, in particular, is seen as indispensable in this process. So a 
consequence of Friedman’s view seems to be this: when scientists each prefer 
(radically) different conceptual frameworks, but nevertheless manage to engage in 
rational communication about them, then they must at least to some extent be well-
versed in meta-philosophical discourse. We want to show that an alternative 
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response to Kuhn’s challenge is possible. One reason to look for an alternative 
response is that there are socio-empirical reasons to doubt Friedman’s account: By 
and large, scientists are not well-versed in philosophical discourse, and it is not clear 
either that they need to be. If so, then the scientists’ interaction is for the most part 
not communicatively rational in the sense that Friedman adopts from Habermas, or 
successful communication about diverging conceptual frameworks can be facilitated 
by something other than meta-philosophical discourse. Instead, we suggest that the 
theory of conceptual spaces explains the communicative success, without 
committing to the third level of Friedman’s three-tiered neo-Kantian view. Our aim 
in the next section, then, will be to argue that it is not necessary to deploy the 
entirety of philosophical discourse in order to explain that radical changes to a 
conceptual framework can be communicatively rational. If we are right, then the 
theory of conceptual spaces provides an alternative response to the Kuhnian 
challenge. 
 
6. Communication about Theoretical Frameworks as Conceptual Spaces 
It is crucial for our argument to recognize that, like Kuhn’s (1970; 1987; 2000), also 
Friedman’s account remains grounded in a tradition that understands conceptual 
frameworks as linguistic entities, while ours models these entities as (abstract) 
spaces. As we have seen, one may understand genuinely empirical laws as symbolic 
expressions of constraints on the distribution of points over the space spanned by its 
dimensions. This was perhaps clearest for cases such as Newton’s law of gravitation 
that predicts these points to lie on the hyper-surface described by F=GMm/r
2
 
(Gärdenfors & Zenker, 2013). Recall further that the law restricts these points to a 
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subspace of that described by Newton’s second law, F=ma, which is normally 
treated as an axiom of the theory. In brief, on our account a theory consists of a 
conceptual space (the framework) together with constraints on empirically possible 
points in the space (that can be expressed as laws). 
This spatial view extends also to propositions such as Einstein’s light 
principle that, for Friedman, has a priori status (see DiSalle, 2002, 196f.). To 
illustrate, the principle says that the speed of light, c, is constant in all inertial 
reference frames, where c can be dimensionally analyzed as [LT
-1
], i.e., a length [L] 
over a time interval [T]. Interpreted in terms of conceptual spaces, the light principle 
restricts c to a single value, given by the quotient of the dimensions [L] and [T], of 
299,792,458 meters/second. In relativistic treatments of 4D space-time, moreover, 
3D space and 1D time are integral dimensions and so form a domain. This contrasts 
with the Newtonian theory where 3D space and 1D time constitute separate 
domains, gravity is a force acting-at-a-distance, and the speed of light an additive 
magnitude (rather than bound to c). And it similarly contrasts with a Cartesian view 
where, being unrestricted, c marks infinity—giving rise to an interpretation of light 
signals as propagating instantaneously, and so coordinating distant events to local 
ones. 
 When a conceptual framework is analyzed as a spatial structure, the 
empirical laws at Friedman’s first level are demoted in status because, as we have 
seen, they are merely the linguistic means to express constraints on a conceptual 
space. And the same holds for the linguistic expressions known as a priori principles 
or axioms at the second level. After all, the information that linguistic approaches 
take to be expressed by such principles may partly be read off directly from the 
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structure of the space, and so is generated by the combination of dimensions and 
their metric.
15
 And it can partly be read off by interpreting such principles to 
constrain the space, so that predictions warranted by a theory’s empirical content fall 
within the space’s hyper-planes. Consequently, a new conceptual framework, F*, 
with its embedded theory T*, that arise together as a new paradigm in the course of 
Kuhn’s revolutionary science, can be described by applying the five change 
operations (Section 3) to the predecessor framework, F—both F and F* being 
reconstituted as conceptual spaces. And the set of models comprising the empirical 
content of the new theory, T*, that is formulated against the background of F* may 
similarly be understood as a distinct set of constraints.  
The linguistic approach that is used by both Kuhn and Friedman identifies 
such changes in terms of a replacement of sentences, rather than describing the 
changes to a priori principles, axioms, and empirical laws of T into those of T* that 
take place in the transition from the conceptual framework F to the successor F* as 
being determined by a structural modification of F. Furthermore, there is no 
evidence in Friedman’s writings of a principled distinction between a conceptual 
framework, on the one hand, and an empirical theory that is expressed relative to 
that framework, on the other. (In our model, theories are defined by constraints on 
the conceptual space of a theory framework.) For instance, Friedman writes that 
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 To give an elementary example, the fact that relations on dimension such as 
“longer than” and “warmer than” are transitive follows immediately from their one-
dimensional structure, being isomorphic with the real line. Thus the transitivity need 
not be formulated as an axiom, as is standard in most linguistic or logical accounts 
of theories, but is inherent in the dimensional structure of the underlying conceptual 
space. 
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“[t]he key move in general relativity … is to replace the law of inertia—
which, from the space-time perspective inaugurated by special relativity, 
depicts the trajectories of force-free bodies as geodesics in a flat space-time 
geometry—with the principle of equivalence, according to which bodies 
affected only by gravitation follow geodesics in a variably curved space-time 
geometry.” (Friedman, 2002, 187, italics added) 
 
We take such passages as evidence that both the empirical theory and the conceptual 
framework that it presupposes are primarily understood as linguistic entities, so that 
an analysis of their dynamics will need to rely on change operations such as those 
described in the AGM tradition (Alchourrón, Gärdenfors & Makinson, 1985; 
Gärdenfors, 1988).
16
 Here, for instance, the replacement or revision of proposition p 
by q is modeled as the retraction of p followed by the addition of q; the various 
propositions of a theory, moreover, are ordered according to levels of entrenchment 
(Zenker, 2009).  
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 We take Friedman’s employment of the terms “succession,” “transformations” 
and “extension” to reflect the same understanding: 
“I have argued, on the one hand, that the transition from Newton to Einstein 
centrally involves a succession of relativized constitutively a priori principles 
…, and the existence of such diverse constitutively a priori principles, on my 
view, captures the essence of Kuhnian incommensurability. But I have also 
suggested, on the other hand, that the detailed historical route from earlier to 
later constitutive principles exhibits the latter as natural transformations of the 
former—arising as a sequence of ‘minimal extensions’ of our Kantian- 
Newtonian starting point in a succession of new mathematical, empirical, and 
philosophical situations.” (Friedman, 2010, 713) 
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We next turn to the consequences of adopting the spatial perspective on 
theories and their frameworks for scientific communication. As we have seen, a 
model of T is a constrained hyperspace of F which itself is a spatial object 
constituted by dimensions, their metrics, and the way these dimensions form 
domains. Such spatial objects, we submit, form the basis for communication 
between scientists during periods of what Friedman calls “deep conceptual change.” 
These spatial objects allow for identifying some or another set of dimensions and 
constraints as being methodological a priori—making it expectable that scientists 
display diverging preferences as to which dimensions in fact are fundamental in this 
sense—because none of these dimensions count as inherently privileged. For 
instance, in electrodynamics, particle theorists tend to view electrical current as a 
fundamental dimension, while field theorists take electrical charge as fundamental 
(Gärdenfors & Zenker, 2013). And just like Joseph Sneed’s (1971) distinction 
between T-theoretical and T-non theoretical terms, on which structuralists rely 
(Gärdenfors & Zenker, 2011), also the Neo-Kantian distinction between a priori 
principles and empirical laws remains perfectly possible in the context of conceptual 
spaces.  
Our critical objection, however, is that neither such distinctions nor intimate 
knowledge of the philosophical traditions from which they arise appear to be 
indispensable for communication to remain rational in the relevant sense. On a 
cognitive account of meaning and a representation of theories with the aid of 
conceptual spaces, rather, communicative rationality appears to be available prior to 
Friedman’s third level. So, one may assign a priori status to some but not other 
dimensions of an empirical theory’s conceptual framework. But the same appears 
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not to be necessary in order to explain that rational communication between 
proponents of different paradigms, about these differences, is possible during 
periods of deep conceptual change. 
Let us spell out our position a bit more. We do not claim that, when 
successfully communicating, scientists consciously entertain the theory of 
conceptual spaces as a shared background tool. And we neither claim that, if 
scientists were to entertain—consciously or not—the theory of conceptual spaces, 
they would never disagree about issues of theory choice for, as it were, the need to 
persuade, and be persuaded, never arises. Rather, our claim is that the theory of 
conceptual spaces can explain scientists’ communicative successes—particularly 
those related to issues arising inter-paradigmatically—without postulating meta-
paradigmatic philosophical abilities on their behalf. Our view moreover entails that 
persuasive attempts at bringing an opponent to adopt a scientific framework she dis-
prefers need not, ab initio, be outside the realm of rationally reconstructable 
discourse. This is in contrast to the Kuhnian view we criticize. 
At the same time, our account offers little in the way of a positive 
characterization, or general guidance on, how scientists should rationally persuade 
one another. Analysts studying actual scientific discourse may nevertheless find it 
worth considering that inter- and intra-paradigmatic communication failure and 
success alike are not readily explainable by citing the discourse participants’ 
differentially pronounced meta-philosophical abilities. Applying the theory of 
conceptual spaces also for the purpose of describing scientific discourse will make it 
easier to provide good accounts of the communicative phenomena. 
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7. Conclusion 
Philosophy of science has put itself in a deadlock by representing theories as 
linguistic entities (symbolically expressed systems of laws) and by assuming 
semantic realism. This leads to problems understanding how scientists can 
communicate rationally in times of radical theory change. The deadlock witnessed, 
among others, Kuhn’s claim that paradigms are incommensurable. This claim 
ultimately accepts, as an explanandum, what is in fact a reconstructively incurred 
artifact owed to Kuhn’s own theoretical perspective, which is a linguistic one. As a 
remedy, Friedman introduces meta-philosophical discussions as a way of accounting 
for how scientists can communicate in a rational way. However, scientists would 
generally not see the need for such discussions to resolve the conflict between two 
competing theories, even if the frameworks of the theories are different.  
 In contrast, if theory frameworks are modeled as conceptual spaces and 
theories as constraints on such spaces, the communicative challenge will become 
smaller. Frameworks have to be compared in scientific discussions, but this can be 
handled by comparing their geometric or topological properties, instead of relying 
on meta-philosophical considerations. And once theory frameworks are thus 
comparable, the incommensurability aspect of conceptual change collapses into 
referential divergence, or ontological change. In brief, a discussion conducted in 
terms of meta-philosophical principles won’t add much towards guiding “the 
articulation of the new space of possibilities” and making “the serious consideration 
of the new paradigm a rational and responsible option” (Friedman, 2002, 190). 
We have provided reasons to doubt that addressing radical meaning changes 
in adequate ways requires, or makes indispensable, the meta-philosophical principles 
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at the third level of Friedman’s account. Instead, we have argued, if mutual inter-
paradigmatic communication between scientists shall be saved—so that, also from 
the point of view of the old paradigm, the new conceptual framework can be seen as 
rationally superior to the former (Kindi, 2011, 337)—then a reconstruction of the 
successive conceptual frameworks as two conceptual spaces already allows for such 
mutual inter-paradigmatic communication. So Friedman’s three-tiered method of 
handling Kuhn’s challenge can be replaced by a cognitively and communicatively 
more economical account. 
In conclusion, we find that Friedman’s neo-Kantian perspective has some 
advantages over a sentence-based account (such as logical positivism) or Kuhn’s 
position. Nevertheless, his third level has little role to play in actual scientific 
discourse; for most purposes that are of concern to scientists, it is sufficient to rely 
on a comparison between the spatial frameworks of the theories under scrutiny. 
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